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## ON PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE OF SELVES

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### THE ADVANCING CLAIMS OF SELF-PSYCHOLOGY

Self-psychology was at first brought forward by Professor Calkins as one of the possible points of view in psychology. In "Psychology as Science of Selves" (1900) she writes: "This essay [insists] . . . on the equal validity of two underlying forms of psychology . . . The first of them may perhaps be named 'Atomistic Psychology'. It treats of . . . psychic phenomena, considered without reference to any self, and its primary procedure is the analysis of these psychic facts into irreducible elements and the classification of complex phenomena according to the preponderance of given elements. For the second of these ultimate forms of psychology I have vainly sought a satisfactory name. It is distinct from the science of the bare psychic contents, and has been variously regarded as a study of conscious functions, of mental operations, and of activities of the self. Most simply and with adequate recognition of the profoundly social nature of the self, this form of psychology may be treated as the science of conscious selves."<sup>2</sup>

In the "Introduction to Psychology" (1904) we find similar statements. "The book is written in the conviction that psychology should study consciousness, both as a series of complex mental processes, or ideas, and as a relation of conscious selves to each other"<sup>3</sup>; and, again, "We defined science as the study of facts or phenomena, that is of limited bits of reality, taken for granted without investigation of their relation to the whole of reality. Now it is certain that consciousness, or ideas, regarded without reference to a conscious self, may form the material of a scientific psychology; and some psychologists have limited the science to the study of these momentary contents of consciousness, not regarded as the experiences of a self. But it is equally evident, in the opinion of the writer,

<sup>1</sup> From the Psychological Seminary of Cornell University.

<sup>2</sup> M. W. Calkins, *Psychology as Science of Selves*, *Phil. Rev.*, 9, 1900, 490.

<sup>3</sup> *An Introduction to Psychology*, 1904, v.

that selves also may be treated as facts or phenomena, because they are taken for granted by everyday people, without inquiry about their relation to 'reality.'"<sup>4</sup>

In "Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie" (1905) Miss Calkins again urges her position. "Psychologically we may consider consciousness from two points of view: we may conceive consciousness either as a series of linked psychical processes, wholly without reference to the conscious I, or as a many-sided consciousness of the real I in its relations. In accordance with these two points of view we have a twofold psychology: process-psychology and I-psychology. Every consciousness can be looked at from both points of view: in other words, both methods can be consistently worked out."<sup>5</sup>

So far (1905) the point of view of self-psychology has been urged on the ground that it is as valid a form of psychology as 'atomistic' (or 'structural') psychology. Now, however, we find it offered as a mediator, a reconciliation between other forms of psychology. In "A Reconciliation Between Structural and Functional Psychology" (1906) Miss Calkins writes: "I shall . . . try to show [that] that psychologist's self is rightly conceived as fundamental both to structural and to functional psychology, and that it should therefore be studied by both methods."<sup>6</sup> The conception of the self, we read, "facilitates, and necessitates a union between structural and functional psychology."<sup>7</sup> The argument is that: "(1) structural psychologists and one group (but one group only) of functional psychologists are unjustified in their doctrines of the basal psychic phenomenon; but that (2) in their doctrines of psychological analysis, both structural and functional psychology are right: the analysis of the one supplements that of the other . . . (3) . . . both sorts of analysis, structural and functional, are essential to an adequate self-psychology." In greater detail, Miss Calkins argues as follows: "Structural psychology consists essentially in the teaching that the task of psychology is first, to analyse typical experiences until one reach irreducible elements, and second, to classify the ordinary sorts of complex experience according as one or another of these elements predominate . . . Now it is past doubt that this structural analysis of a psychic state is always possible . . . But this analysis into structural elements—it must be insisted—is not necessarily the analysis of an idea or psychic

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 156.

<sup>5</sup> *Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie*, 1905, 32 f.

<sup>6</sup> *Psych. Rev.*, 13, 1906, 61 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, 68.

event: it is, on the other hand, quite as easy to discover the structural elements regarded as experience of a self, for though every conscious experience is some relation simple or complex, of a self to its environment, it is also a complex of different elemental experiences, sensational, affective and the like . . . . In a word, psychology as science of conscious and related selves may and should undertake the analytic discovery of elements of conscious experiences as such. By virtue of this structural procedure it is truly a structural psychology, though it utterly repudiates the doctrine of the psychic event, or idea as the basal fact of psychology." After some discussion Miss Calkins concludes that "functional psychology, rightly conceived, is a form of self-psychology, that its basal phenomenon is the psychologist's self, and that its significant contributions to psychology are, first, its doctrine of the inherent relatedness of self to environment, and second, its insistence on the progressive efficiency or utility of these relations . . . . Pruned of . . . biological excrescences, a functional psychology . . . is a self-psychology."<sup>8</sup>

Self-psychology, then, has been offered first as a possible form of psychology; and next as the form which "harmonizes the essential doctrines of a structural and of a functional psychology."<sup>9</sup> As we might expect, out of the latter conception comes the belief that self-psychology is a form of psychology superior to the others. This idea is developed to some extent in the article just cited. Miss Calkins says: "I shall aim to show . . . first that these actual (concrete conscious) experiences cannot adequately be described by enumerating their structural elements, and second, that the conception of them as relations of self to environment involves or allows all the teachings essential to functional psychology." In a later article<sup>10</sup> is a more insistent statement: "I am myself profoundly convinced that consciousness is never adequately conceived except as conscious self; and that both the other conceptions of consciousness [structural and functional] imply this." The inadequacy of structural psychology is stated as follows: "If I conceive psychology as science of ideas I inevitably raise the scientifically relevant question:<sup>11</sup> Whose idea? and then I

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, 75.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, 76.

<sup>10</sup> *Journ. of Phil., etc.*, 4, 1907, 677 f.

<sup>11</sup> It may be suggested here that Miss Calkins must be generalizing from her own experience. Many psychologists have conceived psychology as "science of ideas" without raising the question; indeed, these psychologists see no more necessity for raising it than the physiologist sees for asking "Whose muscle?" or the geologist "Whose stone?"

arbitrarily refuse to answer my own question. In other words, the 'idea' is immediately experienced as idea of a self, or subject, mind, ego—call it as one will. To refuse to deal with this self is indeed theoretically possible, but is a needlessly abstract, an artificial, an incomplete procedure."<sup>12</sup> Moreover, "an idea psychology is incapable, through this fundamental inadequacy, of describing some, at least, of the facts which it studies." Functional psychology, also, is inadequate. We find that "narrowly scrutinized, the theory of psychology as science of mental activities turn out to be a needlessly abstract, an arbitrarily inadequate view. For activity is clearly a character of something . . . One inevitably and rightly asks concerning any character not only 'of what sort is it?' but 'whose is it?' . . . In truth, the conception of mental activity requires the conception of mental actor, even more obviously than the full conception of the idea includes that of its possessor."<sup>13</sup>

The superiority of self-psychology is still further set forth in Miss Calkins' "First Book in Psychology" (1910). In the preface we read: "This book has been written in the ever strengthening conviction that psychology is most naturally, consistently, and effectively treated as a study of conscious selves in relation to other selves and to external objects—in a word, to their environment, personal and impersonal . . . I have . . . abandoned . . . [the] double treatment [of psychology both as science of selves and as science of ideas] . . . not because I doubt the validity of psychology as study of ideas, but because I question the significance and the adequacy, and deprecate the abstractness of the science thus conceived."

In the last edition (1914) of this book we find many indications not only that self-psychology is more consistent than other forms of psychology, but also that the change in point of view has rendered former expressions inadequate. One example of this occurs in the preface.<sup>14</sup> "If I were writing this book *de novo* I should throughout refer to the sensational, affective, and reflective elements in such a way as to emphasize the fact that they are found through analysis of consciousness conceived as relation of self to object. Thus I should use the expressions 'seeing colors,' 'hearing tone-qualities,' 'liking,' 'distinguishing,' along with, or even in place of the parallel expressions, 'visual and auditory qualities' . . ."

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<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, 678 f.

<sup>13</sup> *Journ. of Phil., etc.*, 682.

<sup>14</sup> xii f.

We have now outlined in brief the advancing claims of self-psychology, first as a possible, then as a reconciling, and last as the most natural, consistent and effective form of psychology. With this introduction to the subject, we shall consider the system of self-psychology; and shall discuss in order its subject-matter, method, problem, and results; for it is with reference to these points that any scientific system must be appraised. The subject-matter of self-psychology is, of course, the self; and it is to the self-psychologist's self that we shall first turn our attention.

### THE SYSTEM OF SELF-PSYCHOLOGY

#### *The Concept of the Self*

Miss Calkins' conception of the self is not clear. In the most general way, her self is a fact, a phenomenon, that stands at the same level as qualities, things, moments, events. The self is also conceived as having characters. Although Miss Calkins follows her general statements immediately with her discussion of the characters, for the sake of clearness we shall first treat of the general concept and then, in another section, of the characters.

The self is a fact, in the same category with things and events. It may be viewed in the light of various metaphysical systems, but "no one of these . . . systems precludes the scientific treatment of selves."<sup>15</sup> These statements, of course, tell us nothing definite. A further search reveals that "besides realizing my conscious experiences, or feelings, I am also conscious of my conscious self, as in a sense including, but not as identical with, the perceptions, the emotions, or the thoughts of any given moment;"<sup>16</sup> and in "Der doppelte Standpunkt" we read: "Self-consciousness can—at least partially—be described from two sides. We can first analyse the self-consciousness as well as the psychical processes into so-called elements."<sup>17</sup> Miss Calkins recognizes three sorts of "structurally elemental consciousness:"<sup>18</sup> sensational, affective, and relational. But in what sense, we may ask, does my conscious self include the perceptions of the moment? It is evident that, for Miss Calkins, the self is not merely the sum of its perceptions, emotions, and the like; but we are not told what it is in addition to these, or what it is instead of the sum-total of these. She adds, however, that "with the exception of the

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<sup>15</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 492.

<sup>16</sup> *Introduction to Psychology*, 151 f.

<sup>17</sup> 34 f.

<sup>18</sup> *First Book*, 1914.

analysis into structural elements, the only description of self-consciousness is, first, as consciousness of myself contrasted with other selves, and second, as consciousness of my varying relations or attitude to these other selves."<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, this statement does not aid us; for instead of continuing the line of thought and telling us the differences between ourself and other selves, she considers only the consciousness of "my varying relations to other selves." As we are not, at present, interested in the relations of the self, but merely in the self itself, we must continue the search for information concerning it.

In "Der doppelte Standpunkt" we read: "This I, the self or subject, cannot, of course, be defined, for it is the most intimate, most fundamental thing that we know, and, on that account cannot be reduced to other terms. The I is simply the I; everyone knows for himself what it is . . . We can first analyse the self-consciousness . . . into so-called elements . . . In the second place, we know that the real self or I is known in contrast and in relation to other selves; so we reach the important conclusion that each I is essentially a social I."<sup>20</sup> There are various comments to be made on this passage. In the first place we must acknowledge that, if it is true that the self cannot be defined, we are unreasonable in expecting Miss Calkins to define it. But as she distinguishes between selves and "things," she should be able to point out the differences (attributive or other) between the two. In the second place, it is surely not true that everyone knows for himself what the I is. The actions of the plain man may be *interpreted* to mean that he knows what the I is,<sup>21</sup> just as his choice of language in speaking of the sun might be interpreted to mean that he knows the sun revolves about the earth. Yet astronomy would be no science if it took as its fundamental fact that the sun revolves about the earth, just because everybody says that it does. What answer can Miss Calkins make to the person who says: "I do not know what the I is?" In the third place, it is no assistance to one hunting for a description of the self to say: "the real self is *known*

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<sup>19</sup> *Introduction to Psychology*, 151 f.

<sup>20</sup> 34 f.

<sup>21</sup> The writer took occasion recently to ask a number of persons, none of them students of psychology, exactly what they meant by the I. The answers were marked by variety and evasiveness; and the majority might be simmered down to the one given by an intelligent working-man after a day's meditation. This was the answer: "Conundrum, ain't it?" The offhand appeal to the 'plain man' of the philosophers is, indeed, a curious recourse for the scientific psychologist. Why not collect observations?

in contrast and in relation to other selves." Aside from the circularity of the statement, it is no *description* to say the self is *known as related*. *What* it is that is known, how it is known as related, and under what conditions it is known as related, are not stated. And, for one, the writer must assert that either she does not understand the expression or else she does not know herself as related, except that as the result of a process of logical reasoning she may conclude that she must be related.

In "A Reconciliation Between Structural and Functional Psychology," Miss Calkins writes: "By self as psychic fact I mean what the plain man means by self, in so far as this does not involve the view that body constitutes part of a self. This conscious self, the plain man's self, in the developed form in which we commonly study it, is in the first place realized as underlying the experiences of the moment—as having percepts, images, and the like, or more exactly, as 'perceiving,' 'imagining,' and 'feeling.' And, in the second place, every self, besides being fundamental to its own ideas or experiences, is also a related self. That is to say, I am always conscious of myself as in some way related to my environment social or physical."<sup>22</sup> It is undoubtedly true that the "plain man's self," if it be realized at all, may be "realized as underlying the experiences of the moment" and as being related to environment. But in that case is not the "plain man's self" decidedly metaphysical in character? Is not what he considers the "self of selves" the part which he expects to live, his immortal soul? There must be some foundation for the expression, so common in everyday life, "trying to keep soul and body together." Taken at its face value, the expression implies that a self has two parts: body and soul. Indeed, the other common expression "mind, body, and soul" and the corresponding "physically, mentally, and spiritually" imply a three-part self. Miss Calkins has intentionally omitted the body from her "plain man's self;" but she has also omitted the soul, or spirit, the part of the self which the "plain man" apparently considers the most important.

Let us sum up what we have learned so far about the nature of the self. (1) The concept of the self, as given to us by Miss Calkins, is far from clear; (2) beside structural analysis we must describe the self in terms of the difference between it and other selves—without having these differences stated; (3) the self cannot be defined; (4) by self Miss Calkins means the plain man's self, but she has deprived him of his body and soul.

<sup>22</sup> *Psych. Rev.*, 13, 1906, 63 f.



All these general statements concerning the self really tell us nothing. But before we go on to consider the characters which Miss Calkins ascribes to the self, we shall do well to examine what seems to be the proximate source of this self, and see if that clears the concept at all.

### *James' Concept of the Self*

In his "Briefer Course" James gives the fundamental thought of self-psychology. "Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of *myself*, of my *personal existence*. At the same time it is *I* who am aware."<sup>23</sup> In the "Principles of Psychology" we read such passages as: "The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thought exist' but 'I think' and 'I feel';"<sup>24</sup> "Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which *some* awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We think and as we think we feel our bodies as the seat of the thinking . . . *Whatever* the content of the ego may be, it is habitually felt *with* everything else by us humans;"<sup>25</sup> "All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves thinking . . . I regard this as the most fundamental of all the postulates of psychology."<sup>26</sup> When we ask what this self of James' really is, we find that, in the widest possible sense, it is the sum total of all a man can call his; "not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works."<sup>27</sup> We find also that there are various constituents of the self, which may be divided into two classes: the Empirical self, made up of the Material Self, the Social Self, and the Spiritual Self, and the Pure Ego. The characters of these selves are given in some detail: "The body is the innermost part of the Material Self in each of us . . . The clothes . . . Our immediate family . . . Our home . . . A man's Social Self is the recognition he gets from his mates . . . Properly speaking a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind . . . A man's fame, good or bad, and his honor or dishonor, are names for one of his social selves . . . By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or sub-

<sup>23</sup> W. James, *Psychology*, 1905, 176.

<sup>24</sup> W. James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1890, I, 226.

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, 241.

<sup>26</sup> *Op. cit.*, 185.

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, 291.

jective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely; not the bare principle of personal Unity, or 'pure' Ego . . . These . . . are the most enduring and intimate part of the self."<sup>28</sup> James then goes on to discuss this "self of all the other selves," and concludes that everybody would call it the "active element in all consciousness." "This central part of the self is . . . no *mere* summation of memories or *mere* sound of a word in our ears. It is something with which we also have direct sensible acquaintance." Upon careful examination, this "self of selves" proves for James to consist mainly of "peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat."

We find, then, in James the fundamental thought of self-psychology: that "I am always more or less aware of myself." A corresponding statement is made by Miss Calkins: "I am always, inattentively or attentively, conscious of the private, personal object, myself, whatever the other objects of my consciousness."<sup>29</sup> On the face of them, these two statements seem almost identical; but in reality they are quite different. The self of which James was "always more or less aware" was mainly, motions in the head; that of which Miss Calkins is "always . . . conscious" cannot be defined. James' self is carefully differentiated from the other selves, the selves which seem important to the plain man; Miss Calkins' self is the plain man's self (*minus* body). We find in James a detailed discussion of what we feel when we become aware of the existence of the 'self of selves;' we find no such detailed discussion in Miss Calkins, but are told only that the self is "immediately experienced as possessed of characters."

It is evident that the fact that James gives us the fundamental thought of self-psychology does not make James a self-psychologist. In the first place, we find in James several exceptions to the ever-present awareness of self. He says: "A mind which has become conscious of its own cognitive function, plays . . . 'the psychologist' upon itself. It not only knows the things that appear before it; it knows that it knows them. This stage of reflective condition is, more or less explicitly, our habitual adult state of mind. It cannot, however, be regarded as primitive. The consciousness of objects must come first. We seem to lapse into this primordial condition when consciousness is reduced to a minimum by the inhalation of anaesthetics or during a faint."<sup>30</sup> He then quotes

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<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, 202 ff.

<sup>29</sup> *First Book*, 1914, 5.

<sup>30</sup> *Principles*, 272.

Herzen to the effect that "at the beginning of coming-to, one has at a certain moment a vague, limitless, infinite feeling—a sense of *existence in general* without the least trace of distinction between the me and the not-me," and gives various other instances in which no consciousness of self is present. The statement that I am always "more or less aware of myself" must be changed for James to read "The normal human adult under normal conditions is always more or less aware of himself." Self-psychology, on the other hand, is founded on the postulate that the statement is *always* true for man, and is true for babies and animals as far as they are conscious at all.<sup>31</sup> Again James seems to disagree with the first principles of self-psychology when he says: "Many philosophers . . . hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish between the thing and its own self. This is a perfectly wanton assumption, and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing it to be true. As well might I contend that I cannot dream without dreaming that I dream, swear without swearing that I swear, deny without denying that I deny, as maintain that I cannot know without knowing that I know. I may have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about an object *O* without thinking about myself at all. It suffices for this that I think *O* and that *O* exists. If, in addition to thinking *O*, I also think that I exist and that I know *O*, well and good."<sup>32</sup> But Miss Calkins says that "to be conscious is to be conscious of my conscious self." A third difference between James and the self-psychologist is that James "notices" the characters of thought, whereas Miss Calkins "immediately experiences" the characters of the self. We need not stop here to discuss this point, as the question of the immediate experiencing of the characters of the self will be considered in a later section of the paper. The fourth difference between James' and Miss Calkins' selves has already been suggested: the fact that James' self is described in terms of sensation, while Miss Calkins' self cannot be expressed in terms either of idea or of function, but is immediately experienced as having certain characters.

Our consultation of James has brought out the fact that, although he gives the fundamental thought of self-psychology, the self of which he speaks is not the self of which Miss Calkins speaks. If we try to equate Miss Calkins' self with one of James', we find, first, that her self cannot be the Material

<sup>31</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 5, 1908, 68.

<sup>32</sup> *Principles*, I, 274.

Self and cannot be the Social Self; neither can it be the pure Ego. If, then, it is any of James' selves, it must be the Spiritual Self. At first glance, it seems to resemble this self; only that James discovers "motions in the head," while Miss Calkins comes out with nothing of the sort. We must, therefore, conclude that James, although he gives us a perfectly clear idea of his self, helps us very little toward understanding Miss Calkins' self.

### *The Characters of the Self*<sup>33</sup>

It is hardly fair to Miss Calkins, however, to give up the search for the real nature of the self until we have examined her account of its characters; for, as she says, we are not merely always conscious of ourselves, but we are also conscious of ourselves as possessing certain characters. These characters, moreover, are said *not* to belong to idea or to function,<sup>34</sup> and so are employed to distinguish the self from idea and function. In the "First Book"<sup>35</sup> we read: "The conscious self . . . is immediately experienced as possessed of at least four fundamental characters. I immediately experience myself as (1) relatively persistent . . . as (2) complex . . . as (3) a unique, irreplaceable self . . . I experience myself as (4) related to (or, conscious of) objects either personal or impersonal."<sup>36</sup>

### *The Persistence of the Self*

The first character of which Miss Calkins treats is persistence. The self, we read, is experienced as "in some degree," "in some sense," "relatively" persistent; "in other words, I am in some sense the same as my childhood self."<sup>37</sup> By persistence

<sup>33</sup> The characters of the self are discussed by Miss Calkins in *An Introduction to Psychology*; *Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie*; *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 5, 1908, 64 ff.; and *First Book in Psychology*.

<sup>34</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 65.

<sup>35</sup> 1914.3.

<sup>36</sup> There is a passage in James (I., 225) which seems to suggest, at least, the characters which Miss Calkins ascribes to the self. "How does [thought] go on? We notice immediately five important characters in the process. . . . (1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness. (2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing. (3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous. (4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself. (5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others." Here certainly may be found the germs of persistence, complexity, and relatedness.

<sup>37</sup> *First Book*, 3.

is not meant ultimate self-identity, but the "kind of identity of which one is immediately conscious."<sup>38</sup>

What precisely do the above statements mean? A translation of the sentence "I am conscious of myself as relatively persistent" might read "I, the present self, am continually conscious of a past self." I, in a sense, *i. e.* in so far as I go by the same name, in so far as I have some of the same ideas, habits, relationships to friends, in general in so far as I have the same functional relations to my environment that I formerly had, am still the same I. But is it not just as true that, in a sense, *i. e.*, in so far as I have different functional relations to my environment, behave differently in the face of the same objective situations, have different ideas, different habits, and so on, I am a different I? Do I not, in other words, just as often, just as emphatically, and just as immediately experience myself as different from my childhood self? And if the first consideration means that self is persistent, does not the second mean that self is at the same time, or in another sense, just as non-persistent as it is persistent? 'Relatively persistent' surely means 'not exclusively or absolutely persistent.' The positive logically involves the negative statement; partial sameness necessarily involves partial difference. Non-persistence, therefore, has the same claim to be a character of the self as has persistence.

But not only may we question whether persistence has a better claim than non-persistence to be considered a character of the self; we may also ask if persistence is *exclusively* a character of self. Miss Calkins dismisses Angell's statement that "general functions like memory (are) persistent" with the remark that "if one scrutinize the real meaning of this statement 'memory—or reason—or will is a persistent function' one finds it to be simply this, that one and the same self at any time may remember or reason or will."<sup>39</sup> Why does she not say that it means that one and the same self *at all times does* remember *and* reason *and* will? That surely seems to be the meaning which Angell intends. Mind for the functional psychologist is a general function (for example, accommodation to the novel) within which less inclusive but still quite general functions (memory, thought, etc.) may be discriminated. Never in the concrete do we find any single general function active in isolation; but, wherever we find consciousness, there we find all these general functions; and in so far

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<sup>38</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., *loc. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

as consciousness is persistent, in *so far* are the functions persistent.

Persistence, then, is no more a character of the self than is non-persistence, nor is self to be distinguished from function by means of this character. On the contrary, self appears to be merely another name of the all-inclusive mental function.

### *The Uniqueness of the Self*

We come now to the question of the uniqueness of the self, and of the relation of this uniqueness to the persistence of the self. We find that "I immediately experience myself . . . as a unique, irreplaceable self—I am closely like father, brother, or friend, but I am, after all, only myself; there is only one of me."<sup>40</sup> "This uniqueness is . . . experienced most clearly in our emotional and volitional consciousness: when we reflect upon it we may describe it as a consciousness of a this-which-could-not-be-replaced-by-another. Now we simply are not conscious of ideas and functions as, in this sense, unique. A given self, with a different idea, is still this self; whereas a given idea is this or that idea according as it belongs to this or that self. I am I whether I see or hear, whether I fear or hope, but another self's vision or fear, however similar, is not this experience, but another."<sup>41</sup>

But *why*, we may ask, is a self with a different idea still the same self? Miss Calkins, herself, as we shall see (p. 82), insists that one essential, never-to-be-neglected character of the self is the *having*, among other things, of ideas. Is it, then, that the *having* is the same whatever the idea is that is had? Is it the same thing to have one idea as to have another? May there be a *having* without an idea had? May we, so far as self is concerned, abstract from idea but not from the *having of ideas*? Is a self without any ideas possible? Are we in dreamless sleep, *e. g.*, still self-conscious? These and other questions, for which we find no answer, are at once suggested. Certainly, the concept of having and the other concepts so freely used need clarification and definition. Certainly, if (as Miss Calkins maintains in another place) "there can be no objection to considering ideas as part of the self,"<sup>42</sup> then a change of a part means a change of the whole, and the self with another idea is not, and cannot be regarded as, the same self.

"A given idea," says Miss Calkins, "is this or that idea

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<sup>40</sup> *First Book*, 3.

<sup>41</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 66.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

according as it belongs to this or that self." In the sense of a structural psychology,—and it is in this sense that Miss Calkins on her own assertion speaks of ideas,—the essence of ideas does not consist in their being had by a self, but rather in their attributive determinations. If ideas differ *only* in respect to what self has them, then all the ideas of a given self are identical, or a given self can have only one idea. In fact, ideas, in the sense both of structural psychology and of the passages of Hume which Miss Calkins quotes in her own behalf in another connection, are themselves unique. "Another self's vision or fear, however similar, is not this experience, but another," says Miss Calkins. True, but not the whole tale! In exactly the same way, *my present* vision or fear, however similar to my *past* vision or fear, is not my past vision or fear, but another. That is Hume's story. And what holds of the uniqueness of ideas holds also of functions. Why is not a remembering-now a not-to-be-replaced-by-another remembering? I can never remember at this particular now again; I never did remember at this particular now before. But the case is not yet ended; uniqueness is not peculiar to ideas and functions. A given chair is unique, every hair on my head is unique; they 'cannot be replaced by others.' In the most general way, every concrete object, every actually existing thing in the world is unique.

And the question now arises, can a self be unique and not persistent, or persistent and not unique? The plain man probably considers himself unique. But he does not talk as if he considered himself persistent when he says, for example, of himself or another, that he "lost himself," "forgot himself," "could not recognize himself," "was not himself," "was out of himself."<sup>43</sup> These expressions sound, at any rate, as if the plain man's self were for him an ideal and not a real persistent being. Moreover, there are times when we become so absorbed in a book or play that for the time being we, to all intents and purposes, *are* the hero, say, and apparently have no consciousness of our ordinary self. Granted that in such a case we are unique; are we also persistent? If we are persistent because we are in some sense the same as the childhood self of the hero whom we for the moment are, then we must be any number of persistent selves. But this cannot be; for we are, by hypothesis, unique: "I am closely like father, brother, or friend, but I am, after all, only myself; there is only one of me." But if I can be Hamlet, why can I not at some other time be "father, brother, or friend?" Or, in

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<sup>43</sup> E. B. Titchener, *Text-book*, 1910, 13.

general: is this self a this-not-to-be-replaced-by-another, if we are at various times various selves? Miss Calkins has answered the question of "losing oneself" in a book or play by saying: "Selfconsciousness is surely present when a man seems to himself 'a person' even though another person. He is unconscious . . . of circumstances, of surroundings, of the past, but not of self."<sup>44</sup> But he cannot be conscious of self (according to Miss Calkins) without being conscious of that self as persistent, complex, unique, and related. If he is conscious of himself *in this situation* as persistent and unique, then surely he may have as many selves as he desires, or has thrust upon him, each one of them unique and relatively persistent; a curious condition for the plain man's self!

Uniqueness, then, cannot be a distinguishing character of the self, because ideas and functions and all concrete objects are also unique. In the second place, it is difficult to apply the characters of uniqueness and persistence together to all the situations in which the self is found.

#### *The Complexity of the Self*

A third character of the self is that it is "inclusive; it is, in other words, a complex of ideas, functions, experiences."<sup>45</sup> "I am a perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self."<sup>46</sup> "This is the character of the self which gives to the idea and function conceptions of psychology their hold on psychological thought; for against ideas or functions regarded as parts, or aspects, of the self no crucial objection need be urged."<sup>47</sup>

Whatever the concept of the self, there can be no doubt that complexity is one of its characters. But Miss Calkins has neglected, in the case of complexity, to prove the thesis with which she started: namely, that the characters of the self do not belong to idea or function. She makes no attempt to prove that ideas and functions are not complex; and it is evident that no such proof could be offered, for, in this sense, we have no simple experiences. Complexity, therefore, cannot be used as a distinguishing character of the self.

#### *The Relatedness of the Self*

We come to the fourth and last character of the self, its relatedness. "I immediately experience myself . . . as related to (or, conscious of) objects either personal or impersonal. For example, I am fond of my mother . . . and I am tasting

<sup>44</sup> *Psych. Bull.*, 9, 1912, 25 ff.

<sup>45</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., *loc. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> *First Book*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., *loc. cit.*



an orange . . . It would be impossible to enumerate all the 'personal attitudes' or relations of self to its objects. The following, however, are fundamental . . . receptivity and activity; sympathy . . . attention."<sup>48</sup> This character is the keynote of Miss Calkins' whole system of psychology; for we find that the full definition of psychology is "the science of self in relation to environment"<sup>49</sup> or the "science of the self in relation to, or conscious of, its environment."<sup>50</sup>

In the "Introduction to Psychology" we have: "I, who read this paragraph . . . simply cannot be conscious of my own self except as related in the most varying ways to a vast number of other people. Let one try to drop out of the consciousness of oneself the realization, however vague, of some or all of these relations, the consciousness that one is son, brother, member of a fraternity, student at a university, citizen of the United States: such an imagined elimination of the consciousness of his social relationships leaves a man, in truth, with nothing which he can recognize as himself." In the 1914 edition of the "First Book" Miss Calkins states that she uses the term consciousness "as synonym for 'personal attitude' or 'the self's relatedness to its objects.'"<sup>51</sup> Now, if one define consciousness as relatedness to environment, then it must of course be true that one is conscious of all of one's relations. So if we accept Miss Calkins' definition of consciousness,<sup>52</sup> we must accept her statement as to the relatedness of the self. But it is curious to "immediately experience" four characters of the self, and then to find that one of these characters really includes the other three. Yet, under the above definitions, this is evidently the case with the character of relatedness. The self must be "conscious of" the persistence, the complexity, and the uniqueness of the self; how else can these characters be known? But to be conscious of means to be related to, and so we come back to the fourth character. What are the persistence, uniqueness, and complexity of the self other than ways in which the self may be *related*? Let us first consider persistence. Why should not the character of persistence be included under that of relatedness? By 'rela-

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<sup>48</sup> *First Book*, 1914, 3.

<sup>49</sup> *First Book*, 1910, 273.

<sup>50</sup> *First Book*, 1914, 1.

<sup>51</sup> xii f.

<sup>52</sup> This definition of consciousness, when considered with reference to the character of relatedness, presents certain difficulties: for example, if we try to substitute words which Miss Calkins uses as synonyms we become confused. The sense of the following is scarcely clear: "I am related to myself as related to objects."

tively persistent' I mean "I am in some sense the same as my childhood self." Does that not also mean that "I experience myself as in some way related to my childhood self?" In the second place, how can I experience myself as unique, as "closely like father, brother, . . . but after all, only myself," without differentiating myself from father and brother? But I surely cannot differentiate myself from others without experiencing myself as in some way related to them. And as for the complex character of the self, I cannot again experience myself as "perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self" without experiencing myself as perceiving, etc., something, that is, as *related to* an object, personal or impersonal. But we need not continue, since Miss Calkins herself writes:<sup>53</sup> "The relatedness of a self . . . may be shown to be a character of all consciousness."<sup>54</sup>

We find, further, apparent inconsistencies in the treatment of the different characters. For example, in the 2nd edition of the "First Book" the structural elements are assigned to the complex character: "The mental reduction of this complex experience to its lowest terms gives what are called the structural elements of consciousness;"<sup>55</sup> while in the 4th edition they are assigned to the character of relatedness: "It is possible by attentive introspection to detect within every . . . relation of the self to object, certain elemental (that is, further irreducible) factors or constituents . . . the 'structural elements' of consciousness," and: "From this follows the conception of the sensational, affective and relational 'elements' . . . as constituents of all forms of the relatedness of self to objects."<sup>56</sup> In spite of such statements as the last two, Miss Calkins makes complexity a separate character of the self, and further defines it by saying "I am a perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self." But surely the 'structural elements' come from the perceptions, etc.; so that they must come from both complexity and relatedness. This result reinforces our former conclusion that the character of relatedness really includes the other three characters.

We have now considered the four characters of the self; have shown that persistence is no more a character of the self than non-persistence is; have shown that some functions at least are persistent; that ideas and functions as well as selves

<sup>53</sup> This statement reads as if persistence, uniqueness, and complexity were *not* characters of all consciousness, as they have at other times been stated to be.

<sup>54</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 17, 1908, 272 ff.

<sup>55</sup> 14.

<sup>56</sup> xii.

are unique, and that therefore the character is not a distinguishing one; that a self cannot always be both unique and not non-persistent; that ideas and functions as well as the self are complex; that, given Miss Calkins' definition of consciousness, the self must be acknowledged as related; but that, under the definitions of the various characters, persistence, uniqueness, and complexity must be accepted as forms or modes of the fourth character, the relatedness.

The conclusion is that Miss Calkins' conception of consciousness and her conceptions of the characters of the self move in a circle. We start with consciousness as the relatedness of the self, immediately experience the self as possessed of four characters which, as we have seen, all reduce to one, namely, to relatedness and so are back at the starting point without appreciable gain.

### *The Self as Knower and as Known*

There is a further point which Miss Calkins does not make clear; namely, the relation between the self as knower and the self as known. We have every right to ask for this distinction, because throughout the system it is implied. For example: "A person or an impersonal fact, to which the self is related, is called its object—that of which it is conscious . . . I am always . . . conscious of the private personal object, myself . . . There are certain externalized objects, in particular my body, of which I am so persistently and attentively conscious that I often seem to regard them as part of myself. And, finally, preëminent among the objects of my environment, are the other selves."<sup>57</sup> "The standpoint from which one speaks of objects of the self is, as James says, dualistic. The basis of the conception is the fact that I always find myself conscious of an object: of myself or my experience, of other self or thing or relation . . . Psychology, if it is to take account of the self, must, therefore, take account of the object."<sup>58</sup> If psychology is, then, to study both selves and objects of selves, which may be the selves themselves, we might expect that there should be some differentiation of the two, so that we might know whether we were talking of selves, or of selves as objects of themselves at the moment. But, on the contrary, nowhere in Miss Calkins' psychology are clear distinctions drawn between the self as knower and the self as known. When considering the question of subject and object she writes: "I am always, inattentively or attentively,

<sup>57</sup> *First Book*, 1914, 3 ff.

<sup>58</sup> *Op. cit.*, 280.

conscious of the private, personal object, myself, whatever the other objects of my consciousness . . . It must be pointed out that certain real difficulties attend the classification of the self's objects. There is . . . the difficulty of conceiving the self as both subject and object . . . But these are difficulties only for the metaphysician. The psychologist, who like every scientist, must accept certain facts, without looking for their ultimate explanation, rests . . . on the immediate certainty that I am conscious of myself."<sup>59</sup> After learning that psychology studies both a knower and a known, we are thus told that we should ask no more about them.

If we turn, now, to Miss Calkins' philosophy for the information which she withholds in her psychology, we find that: "In being conscious of a phenomenal fact, the subject (or knowing self) certainly does know an object different from a self. This does not argue against the existence of another sort of knowledge, in which there is no recognition of subject or object—in which, rather, subject and object coalesce in the experience of my consciousness of myself, as knowing and thinking, feeling and willing."<sup>60</sup> However, on returning to the psychology, we discover that: "I always find myself conscious of an object: of myself or my experience . . ."<sup>61</sup> In Miss Calkins' philosophy, then, there is no subject-object relation in the "experience of my consciousness of myself as knowing, etc.;" while, in her psychology, there apparently is such a relation.

If we continue reading the "First Book" we become more and more confused; for there the "psychological self" is identified with the subject, or the self as knower.<sup>62</sup> It is, of course, not necessary for psychology to take up the problem of knower and known; but it is evident that, if a psychology continually suggests such a distinction, we should expect its author to state which aspect she is considering. It may also be suggested that the question whether the self is knower or known, or both in coalescence, is just as "scientifically relevant" as the question "Whose idea is this idea?"

### *Difficulties in the Concept of the Self*

It is evident from this discussion of Miss Calkins' self that the concept is an extremely complex one, and one from which it is difficult to pick out the important points. We have seen

<sup>59</sup> *Op. cit.*, 3 ff.

<sup>60</sup> *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 1910, 351 f.

<sup>61</sup> *First Book*, 280.

<sup>62</sup> *Op. cit.*, 281.

that the general concept of the self as a fact, as immediately experienced, as the "plain man's self," is far from clear; that persistence, uniqueness, and complexity can not be distinguishing characters of this self; that, under Miss Calkins' definition of consciousness, relatedness must really include the other three characters and, for that matter, the self itself;<sup>63</sup> and that a consideration of the characters of the self has, after all, done little to clear the concept of the self.

We find, however, still other difficulties in the concept. First, various arbitrary limits seem to be drawn in the study of the relations of the self. For example, we find from the Index of Subjects in the "First Book" that we study the self as "persistent . . . complex . . . unique . . . related . . . as egoistic . . . as altruistic . . . as particularizing and individualizing . . . as generalizing . . . as receptive or passive . . . as active or assertive . . . as perceiving and imagining . . . as recognizing . . . as thinking . . . as emotional . . . as willing . . . as believing . . . as social . . . as religious . . . as object . . . as subject . . . secondary or subconscious self." There seems to be no reason for stopping here. Why should we not go on and discuss the self as singing, as teaching, as philanthropic, as atheistic, as measuring the declination of a star, and so on? For "From the conception of psychology as science of myself in relation to my environment, personal and impersonal, it follows that every concrete personal relation may be the basis of a psychological study."<sup>64</sup> Even with the subject-matter of psychology defined as relations of the self, we are unable to decide what topics it should consider; for Miss Calkins' table confuses rather than clears up the question. The main heading of the table is: "Myself (as subject) is related to (or, conscious of) objects:"<sup>65</sup> This, then, is evidently the subject-matter of self-psychology. But no! for these objects, to which the self is related, are further differentiated into objects of Social Sciences, of Logic, Mathematics, etc., of Physical Science, and of Psychology. Psychology seems here to be made a subdivision of itself, just as, it will be remembered, relatedness was made a subdivision of relatedness.

A more fundamental and a more insistent difficulty is that

<sup>63</sup> If consciousness ("First Book," 1) always "a somebody-being-conscious," then it cannot be true that (*Psych. Rev.*, 13, 1906, 68) "to be conscious is to be conscious of a conscious self." This statement should, on the contrary, read: "to be conscious is to be a conscious self."

<sup>64</sup> *First Book*, 260.

<sup>65</sup> *Op. cit.*, 1914, 4.

the concept of the self is a metaphysical and a logical, not a psychological concept. That it must be a metaphysical concept, if the "plain man's self" is taken as the self, we have already tried to show. That it is a logical concept becomes evident when we find that Miss Calkins is not merely scientifically describing the self, but is rather introducing *meaning* into her concept, is *interpreting* the self. It is the *meaning* of the self that is of prime importance to the plain man; and it is, in the same way, the meaning of the self that is of prime importance to the self-psychologist of Miss Calkins' type.

This criticism has already been made by Pillsbury. "The self, as developed socially, is an interpretation . . . The data that are interpreted we find first, probably, in the constant mass of sensations, strains . . . About these group the socially recognized differences from other individuals, and out of the mass there precipitates an awareness of the self as a meaning."<sup>66</sup> Titchener's criticism of "Der doppelte Standpunkt" pursues a similar line of thought. "With the admission of relational elements into a psychological system the system ceases to be psychological, and becomes so far logical . . . The relational element, in my opinion, is born of the spirit of the older functional associationism, the besetting sin of which lay in its confusion of fact with meaning."<sup>67</sup> The self itself, as well as the relational elements, make the system logical and not psychological; if you start in with *self-meaning* for analysis, as Miss Calkins does, then you must get *relational meanings*. If a "plain man" were asked casually whether or not he considered himself to be persistent, unique, complex, and related, he would possibly agree that he did. He would possibly also agree that he was always changing, was very similar to all other selves, was a unit, and was, in a way, unrelated. In other words, the plain man would accept any meaning which could be applied to his self at some particular time, and would not question the consistency of the characters of the self which he thus obtained. Such a self is, however, not the self directly experienced in those situations in which consciousness of self is very evidently present; and the difference is not merely a difference of degree.

Miss Calkins herself at times acknowledges that she is interested in the logical self; the primary interest of self-psychology is to "understand, not to analyse into elements," that is, to get the meaning, the logical import, not the psychological description. Again we read: "The contemporary functional

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<sup>66</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 16, 1907, 402.

<sup>67</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 15, 1906, 93.

psychologist, not content with describing consciousness as reaction to environment, commonly lays stress on the 'value,' 'meaning,' or 'utility' of the reaction."<sup>68</sup> But, remember, functional psychology pruned of biological excrescences *is* self-psychology; so, then, self-psychology lays stress on 'value,' 'meaning' and 'utility.'

### *The Method of Self-psychology*

The method peculiar to all psychology is introspection. So far Miss Calkins agrees with structural psychologists. But upon further inquiry it develops that by the term introspection Miss Calkins does not mean 'attention and report under instruction,' as the structural psychologist does, but rather reflection. "To observe myself perceiving, remembering, or judging is no longer simply to perceive, to remember, and to judge, but to reflect upon perception, memory, and judgment."<sup>69</sup> Moreover, she holds that the methods of science in general are to describe exactly and to explain, if possible, the phenomena which are observed.<sup>70</sup> Describing consists of analysing and classifying; therefore, if psychology is a science, we should expect its method to be observation, description, and explanation. We learn, however, that the method used in self-psychology is different from that used in structural psychology; but exactly how it is different, we find it difficult to discover. In "Psychology as Science of Selves"<sup>71</sup> mention is made of the wide divergence in method of the two kinds of psychology; but we learn nothing of the method of self-psychology. Later we are told that every conscious experience may either be "dissected by the structural psychologist and described as a complex of elements"<sup>72</sup> or may be "frankly acknowledged as experience of selves . . . The more closely . . . we observe ourselves perceiving, the more surely we discover in the background of experience the consciousness of other people, actually or conceivably present, who see what we see." How precisely does the method used to find "in the background of experience the consciousness, etc." differ from the method of structural psychology? Again it is asserted that selves are to be "studied in their diverse relations to each

<sup>68</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 4, 1907, 681.

<sup>69</sup> *First Book*, 7. While it is true, of course, that reflection precedes and follows the application of scientific method, it is not true that reflection is a method of science. The method of science is observation.

<sup>70</sup> *First Book*, 1.

<sup>71</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 9, 1900, 494.

<sup>72</sup> *Op. cit.*, 497 ff.

other and to facts of other sorts.”<sup>73</sup> And we learn that “a self-being-conscious is not only analysable into elements but is also a complex of relations to its environment.”<sup>74</sup> In all this there is nowhere a clear statement of method. In other articles we read that “self is *found to have* [italics not in original] certain characters,”<sup>75</sup> but *how* it is found to have them we can not discover. We read that the merely structural analysis is one of the “several essential analyses,”<sup>76</sup> but we never learn what the other essential analyses are. We read that the description peculiar to self-psychology is a description of consciousness “in terms of the characters of the conscious self.”<sup>77</sup> This, to be sure, gives some insight into the *problem* of self-psychology; but, after all, it tells us nothing of the method by which we are to arrive at the description. *How* are we to discover the characters in terms of which consciousness is to be described?

Some suggestion of the method by which we acquire knowledge of the self is given in the sentence: “implicitly, if not explicitly, I am always conscious of a self as having the idea or experience.”<sup>78</sup> But what is the state of affairs when we are “implicitly” conscious of the self? According to dictionary definitions, if something is “implicated” or “implied,” that something is obtained by a process of reasoning; and if Miss Calkins wishes to employ a term in a sense different from that in ordinary usage, she should define it anew. The specific method of psychology has nothing to do with logical reasoning and logical inference, as Miss Calkins herself affirms when she says: “I immediately experience myself as, etc.” So we must leave the “implicit consciousness of self” out of the question; it offers no basis for a psychological system.

We may summarize what we have learned about the method peculiar to self-psychology. (1) The method peculiar to all psychology is introspection; (2) the method of self-psychology is widely divergent from the method of structural psychology; (3) there are other analyses beside structural analyses; (4) every complex experience is both a complex of structural elements and a self related to environment. We must, then, find the method for ourselves. The one difference between the method of self-psychology and that of structural psychology which we find in Miss Calkins’ writings is the difference in the

<sup>73</sup> *Op. cit.*, 501.

<sup>74</sup> *Psch. Rev.*, 13, 1906, 63.

<sup>75</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 5, 1908, 65 ff.

<sup>76</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., 5, 1908, 113.

<sup>78</sup> *First Book*, 274.



meaning given to the term 'introspection.' Miss Calkins uses the term as a synonym for reflection; the structural psychologist uses it as a synonym for observation. The method of self-psychology, therefore, seems to be reflection. This conclusion is sustained by various statements of our author's, such as "The description of imagination as self-consciousness is . . . in exclusively reflective terms."<sup>79</sup> But reflection is the method of logic, and not of science. The conclusion that the method peculiar to self-psychology is the method of logic is, of course, what we should expect if we accept the more general conclusion that the concept of the self is a logical concept, and that the characters of the self have been obtained by logical reasoning.

### *The Problem of Self-psychology*

The problem of self-psychology is never directly stated by Miss Calkins, although we may assume, first, from her discussion of method, that psychology is to describe accurately, to classify and to explain; and from the "First Book," that it hopes to gain "a fuller understanding of these relations [of self to other selves] in their complexity and a deeper acquaintance with my own nature."<sup>80</sup> Moreover, we have self-psychology referred to as "the science of consciousness whose 'primary interest is . . . to understand . . . not to analyse into elements.'"<sup>81</sup> From such statements we must conclude that the problem of self-psychology differs from that of structural psychology in that, besides attempting to describe, it aims also to understand, to obtain a fuller understanding of the relations of selves, and to acquire a deeper acquaintance with one's own nature. But with this problem of understanding and interpreting, self-psychology can scarcely claim a right to the name of science. The problem of a science is to describe accurately the phenomena which it observes;<sup>82</sup> self-psychology has an additional problem, to understand and interpret the relations which it knows immediately or *reflectively*. The opposition of the two is clear.

It is interesting in this connection to continue the quotation

<sup>79</sup> *Journ. of Phil.*, etc., *op. cit.*, 117.

<sup>80</sup> P. 10.

<sup>81</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 9, 1900, 494. The phrase 'primary interest is . . . to understand . . . not to analyse into elements' is quoted from Münsterberg's "Psychology and Life." Münsterberg is speaking of history: but in the preface to Miss Calkins' "Introduction to Psychology" we read: "The conception of psychology as a science of related selves is closely affiliated with Münsterberg's conception of history as science of the relations of willing subjects."

<sup>82</sup> *First Book*, 1.

from Münsterberg which Miss Calkins begins. After speaking of the science whose "primary interest is . . . to understand . . . not to analyse into elements," Münsterberg goes on: "We want to interpret their meanings and not calculate their future . . . All we want to know about them is with what other attitudes they agree or disagree. We have the logical aim, to consider them in their relations to all other will-attitudes and to work out the system of these connections." The problem of self-psychology is, then, for the author of the expression "to understand not to analyse into elements," a logical problem. And not only is the problem of understanding and interpreting relations a problem of logic rather than of psychology; but the further problem (not definitely stated, but hinted as an outcome to be expected) of applying the knowledge thus acquired is also a problem for a technology rather than for a science. In the passage quoted above: "A fuller understanding of these relations . . . and a deeper acquaintance with my own nature may surely, therefore, have a significant influence on my behavior."

It is evident that the problem of self-psychology is much broader than the problems of most psychologies. It is one, moreover, that not only transcends the limits of psychology, but that also infringes on the territory of other disciplines, particularly those of logic, epistemology, and the technologies.

### *The Results of Self-psychology*

The results attained by self-psychology are, in their general nature, what we should expect from the subject-matter, method, and problem. Aside from incidental "structural analysis," the "First Book" gives us detailed and careful statements as to the meaning, significance, and use of various experiences. As the method of self-psychology is to describe and interpret in terms of the characters of the self, the results of self-psychology will, of course, be expressed in these terms

Perception is described as "sensational, passive consciousness reflectively realized as impersonal, particularizing, common to other selves, and as related to present external objects." Imagination is described as "sensational, impersonal, and particularizing, but as lacking the consciousness of passivity, the relation to present objects, and the community." The only characteristics of perception, then, which are "immediately realized" are that it is sensational and passive. The passivity of the self is defined as a 'personal attitude' or 'relation of the self to objects.' The statement that the passivity is immediately experienced is contradicted by a statement made elsewhere,<sup>83</sup> in which Miss Calkins grants that there is no "immediately experienced difference between perception and imagination."

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<sup>83</sup> *Journ. of Phil., etc., loc. cit.*

Attention is stated to be "a unique attitude, a basal relation of self to object, comparable with receptivity or sympathy or activity. This conception may, but need not, be combined with the teaching that there is a structural element of clearness, or attended-to-ness."<sup>84</sup> Here again we have, as we expected, relations of the self. The expression "basal relation" raises the question of the difference between basal relations and other kinds of relations, and how the two are discovered and differentiated; but these questions are not answered.

Recognition is also discussed as "personal attitude;" whether basal or not, is not said. Under the section entitled "Recognition as Personal Attitude" the essential characters of recognition are formulated; the most important is the "emphasized persistence of the self" (another argument for the theory that relatedness really includes the other characters). Upon structural analysis, recognition is distinguished by the prominence of relational elements. The recognizing self is said to be "(1) relationally conscious of, (2) itself as persistent and of objects as related to its past." It is not clear why this sentence should not have read: "the recognizing self is relationally conscious of itself (1) as persistent and (2) as related to objects in the past, or related to its former self as related to objects." Under such an arrangement, the whole description of consciousness would be in terms of the characters of the self, and the necessity of bringing in "structural" elements would be avoided.

In the chapter on thought: "The thinking self is the self (1) relationally conscious (2) of related objects which (3) it knows, reflectively if not immediately, as objects, also, of other selves." And again, there are relational elements in thought. "Conception is the relational consciousness (reflectively attributed to other selves also) of a group or of an object as member of a group." "By 'judgment' . . . is meant the relational consciousness of a whole as including or excluding certain emphasized features, an experience reflectively known as sharable with other selves."

Emotion is discussed as personal attitude and as affective consciousness. Under personal attitude we find that emotion is, "first and foremost, an intensely individualizing experience. . . . In my emotion . . . I immediately realize myself as a unique self . . . and . . . I individualize the object of my love or hate or fear. . . . A second character is its receptiveness." As affective process, emotion is characterized by relational elements, affective elements, and organic sensations.

"Will" is described as "an egotistically assertive consciousness. It is obviously a profoundly attentive and a doubly individualizing experience. . . . From objects of thought of which one is aware as related primarily to each other, objects of will, like objects of emotion, are sharply distinguished in that they are realized as related to the self . . . and as in a way dependent on the willing. . . . The willing consciousness includes . . . sensations of movement . . . the consciousness of (1) futurity, (2) of connectedness, and (3) of realness—experiences corresponding with the characters . . . of the willed object."

Faith and belief are described as "assertive, doubly individualizing adoptive attitudes to objects of any sort, and as distinguished by the elemental consciousness of realness and by that of congruence." Under the heading "religious consciousness" religion is defined as "the con-

<sup>84</sup> P. 104.

scious relation of human self to divine being, that is, to a being or beings regarded as greater than this human self, or than any of its fellows, and either conceived or treated as personal."

In addition to those sections of the book which deal with descriptions of the various relations of the self in the manner illustrated above, we find other passages entitled: "The Uses . . . of Memorizing," "The Uses and Dangers of Conception," "The Uses and Dangers of Reasoning," "The Significance of Emotion." Here we have, evidently, the fulfillment of the aim to obtain "a deeper acquaintance with my own nature" which "may surely . . . have a significant influence on my behavior."

These results of self-psychology, aside from their general nature and the terms of their expression, are surprising for two reasons. First, since structural psychology is at so great pains to standardize conditions, to repeat experiments many times, and to obtain many observers for every detail of its results, it is amazing to find the results of self-psychology given with such definiteness, with such certainty, when apparently Miss Calkins herself has been the only observer, and we are told nothing of the conditions under which she worked, and are unable to verify her results. In the second place, it is strange that, in a psychology so different from structural psychology as is self-psychology, only the topics familiar from structural psychology are discussed. It will be remembered that, in the Index of Subjects to the "First Book" the self was referred to in many relations; though we might have expected it to be studied in many more relations. Instead, now, of finding the self discussed "as active," and so on, the main topics considered are those which occur in any psychology: perception, imagination, memory and so forth,—instead of the self as perceiving, as singing, and all the rest. However, selection of topics is probably due to the fact that tradition has more or less prescribed the topics for psychology in general.

We pass on to consider the significance of the results obtained. In addition to "structural analysis" we find, first, a description of the varying relations of the self. This description is obviously not the kind that may be obtained immediately from observation. It is, on the contrary, the reflective description which an "arm-chair" psychologist could make as well as, if not better than, a psychologist who attentively observes his actual experiences. Any logician, or any "plain man" who is skillful in drawing distinctions of meaning, could distinguish, for example, between "happiness in another's happiness" and "happiness in another's unhappiness;" be-

tween an "assertive attitude with self as object" and "an assertive attitude with other self as object;" between "perception regarded as shareable" and "imagination regarded as unshareable." But if such distinctions can be drawn by one versed in logic and ignorant of psychology, it is at least possible that logic has been introduced into self-psychology to obtain its results.

The second result of self-psychology is the application of results of the first kind. Application, however, belongs not to science, but to a technology. Physics leaves the application of its facts to engineering and the allied technologies; similarly, psychology should leave its applications to its allied technologies, such (Miss Calkins has herself suggested) as ethics, social science, and pedagogy.

### *Conclusion*

Let us now see whether the claim that psychology is "most naturally, consistently, and effectively treated as a study of conscious selves in relation to other selves and to external objects" has been justified.

In the first place, we must repeat that an evaluation of the system is difficult, by reason of the lack of any method by which we might reach Miss Calkins' results. If she would tell us *how* to get the self, and *how* to get the characters and the relations, how in a word her conditions are to be duplicated, we might then have results of our own which should be comparable with hers. In the absence of any such method, we have found that only by a process of logical inference do we arrive at her self with its characters.

Another difficulty is that, no matter how vigorously many psychologists deny the ever-present consciousness of self (which is the apparent excuse that self-psychology has for being),<sup>85</sup> Miss Calkins insists that these psychologists really are self-psychologists, because they at least imply the self "as basal fact." She writes:<sup>86</sup> "The idea-psychologists are implicitly assuming or leading their readers to assume the existence of a self, when they describe consciousness in such words as 'I attend to a color' . . . and still more when they mark off certain experiences as peculiarly personal, that is, as espec-

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<sup>85</sup> Personally, I cannot see why—if we *were* conscious of self all the time—that should necessitate a superior psychology of selves; any more than the fact that we were "inattentively or attentively" conscious of our body all the time should necessitate a superior psychology of bodies.

<sup>86</sup> *First Book*, 279.

ially related to myself."<sup>87</sup> The ground for the assertion that idea-psychologists "unambiguously imply the consciousness of self as part of the experience described in terms of the idea" is apparently the fact that they, like all the rest of the world, use the personal pronoun. The argument, on its most favorable interpretation, is a broken reed. For it is one thing to say that "idea-psychologists . . . assume the existence of a self," and another thing to say that they "imply the consciousness of self as part of the experience . . ." One may "assume the existence of a self" without assuming that one is always conscious of that self; one may assume the existence of the mathematical proof of a formula without being aware of that proof. As to the personal pronoun,—if the use of it makes one a self-psychologist, in Miss Calkins' sense, then her own use of such words as 'garden,' 'motor-car,' 'forehead,' makes her a materialist.

We conclude that Miss Calkins' arguments from "the self as basal fact" are not convincing. We have already suggested (p. 80) that the self of self-psychology seems to be another name for the all-inclusive mental function of functional psychology; and structural psychology can hardly be expected to treat of that self. But, if we cannot accept Miss Calkins' statement that all psychologists are really self-psychologists, can we accept the other statement that "psychology is most naturally, consistently, and effectively treated" as self-psychology? We consider these points in order.

How is psychology most "naturally" treated? How, for that matter, is anything most "naturally" treated? The answer is, apparently that a thing is treated most naturally when treated as the plain man would treat it. There can be no doubt that the plain man would more often consider the relations of persons (or selves, if they must be deprived of body) to each other and to impersonal objects, than he would consider mental processes as such. But then psychology is a science, and not mere common sense. And this puts the matter in a very different light: for no science is "natural" in the sense given above; if it were, it would not differ from casual observation and interpretation; science is, on the contrary, necessarily abstract and, as Miss Calkins would say, artificial.

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<sup>87</sup> Miss Calkins is here referring to the statement made by Titchener: "regarded from the point of view of ordinary life, blue and warm are somehow detachable from oneself, whereas pleasantness is always within oneself." But Titchener does not make the statement "from the point of view of psychology;" and the "plain man's self" surely may not be carried to the point of accepting in psychology distinctions which it makes in 'common sense.'

Science does not aim or hope to be either "natural" or non-abstract. If, then, self-psychology is more "natural" than other psychology, in the sense of standing nearer to the view of the plain man, self-psychology loses thereby rather than gains; for the more "natural" or common-sense-like it gets, the less scientific it becomes.

As for consistency: we have shown that the characters of the self are not consistent, and do not fulfill the duty demanded of them (that of differentiating between self, and idea and function); we have shown that the system is not carried to logical completion. Moreover, as we have already suggested, the topics of self-psychology are surprisingly like those of structural psychology. With fundamental conceptions as different as they are, we should naturally expect the two psychologies to deal with different topics. Self-psychology gives us activity, passivity, egoism, and a number of 'personal attitudes' of which we hear little or nothing in structural psychology; and yet we find no new topics, no new chapters. It is a real question whether Miss Calkins has consistently worked out the results which should follow upon her premises; and the answer to the question is, again, bound up with the exhibition of her method.

The third advantage claimed for self-psychology is effectiveness. The meaning of this term, again, is not very clear. But if it means the production of demonstrable results, we may look for such results either within or without the given science. A science, to be effective within its own limits, must provide stimulus and suggestion for further work. Self-psychology, now, sets out to describe and interpret certain relations of the self in terms of the four characters of the self. Let it be granted that the paragraphs of the "First Book" are both complete and consistent; and let it be granted that they could not have been written by a logician, by any one who was not a psychologist: still, only a few of the relations of the self have been discussed, and there is further work to be done if all the relations are to be handled. That is, so far, promising. But Miss Calkins tells us that it is impossible even to enumerate all these relations. So the further work, to which alone, by hypothesis, we are stimulated, is at the outset acknowledged to be hopeless; and we therefore have small enthusiasm to pursue the method of self-psychology further. As for the outside influence of self-psychology, that is to be exerted in "ethics, social science, and pedagogy." But as these disciplines are, at least in a certain stage of their development, older than self-psychology, it remains a question whether they may not

have helped to shape self-psychology as positively as self-psychology has aided or promises to aid them. Moreover, this sort of argument has, as we have seen, another edge; for application places self-psychology among the technologies, and behind technology there must always be science. So far, then, it seems that the claim of effectiveness remains to be clarified and substantiated.

We must conclude, therefore, that, of the three ways in which Miss Calkins claims self-psychology as superior to other forms of psychology, naturalness is an inferiority in a science rather than a superiority; self-psychology is not effective in the sense that it encourages further work; and finally self-psychology has not been made thoroughly consistent. In the second place, if we may judge it by ordinary standards, self-psychology has a subject-matter which is largely logical and metaphysical; employs a method which is reflection, the method of logic; formulates a problem which is a problem of logic and of technology as well as a psychological problem; and furnishes results which might be obtained without psychological training, simply by a process of reasoning.